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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the issues of inefficiency in the provision of
merit goods, taking the case of public water supply in rural Kerala. The
analysis has identified two source of inefficiency in the provision of
merit good. First, is due to the fact that the state and its agencies
autonomously decide the nature and characteristics of the merit good. If
the nature of good provided is not preferred by the people, or its
consumption require effort on the part of citizens, these may lead to the
non-consumption of the good by a large number of people. Thus, the
definition of safe water as pipe water (from a centralised system) in the
case of Kerala,  lead to its effective non-use by a significant part of rural
population. The second source of inefficiency in the provision of merit
good, is in the selection of the institutional framework. The acquisition
and free distribution of water by the state agency, is the prevailing
institutional framework in Kerala, and this is inappropriate in efficiently
solving the drinking water problem of different localities, taking their
specific characteristics into account. The paper outlines a logical
framework, which can be used to identify the necessary mechanism of
government intervention in water supply in different localities.
JEL Classification : H40, H42, R53
Key Boards: merit good; rural water supply; institutional choice and
inefficiency; new institutional economics; Kerala.3
1. Introduction
There are certain goods like primary education, which the
government may wish its citizens to consume irrespective of their
willingness, for the overall benefit of the society. In such cases,
governments take a direct role in persuading the citizens to consume the
good or service of a specific quantity and quality.  The aim of the public
policy in the case of such goods known as merit goods is to achieve an
allocation of resources which deviates from that determined by consumer
sovereignty. For example, safe drinking water is sometimes taken as a
merit good ‘in the sense that people who receive supplies of safe water
benefit from it to a greater extent than they themselves believe’ (Roth,
1987:243).
The concept of merit goods in economic analysis was first
introduced by Musgrave1. There is a renewed interest in the concept of
merit good in developing countries which are currently undergoing
economic liberalisation, where the relevance of government intervention
in several areas is under critical examination. There is not much conflict
on the need for government intervention in the case of some merit goods.
However, the central issue here is to identify the best possible means of4
intervention, which ensure that people receive, what is intended by the
government, and that too at the cheapest possible cost. This is essential
due to the high opportunity cost of public resources.
This paper makes an attempt to identify the sources of inefficiency
in the provision of such merit goods, through the case study of rural
water supply in the south Indian state of Kerala. An attempt is also made
towards the end of this paper to outline a logical procedure that may
lead to the  selection of the appropriate mode of government  intervention
in the selected case.  Here the discussions on merit good are linked to
the insights on institutional efficiency, provided by the recent
developments in New Institutional Economics. Before analysing the case
study, a hypothetical account of the sources of inefficiency in the
provision of merit goods is given in the following section.
2. Sources of Inefficiency in the Provision of Merit Goods:
A Hypothetical Account
There are two major sources of inefficiency in the provision of
merit goods. First is due to the autonomous characterisation of the nature
of merit good by the state, and second is in the choice of institutional
framework for its provision. These are elaborated one after another in
the following paragraphs.
2.1 Inefficiency due to the characterisation of merit good
It is the government which decides the characteristics, such as
quantity and quality, of the merit good, that it wants its citizens to
consume. By definition, the consumer’s preference or demand pattern
need not reflect in the decision of the government on such goods. Thus
the government’s decisions on these aspects need not always be the one
that suits ‘reality’ or the long term interest of the society2. Two distinct
decisions are involved here: first is the decision to consider a particular5
good as the merit one. For example, a government can decide that a
particular type of moral education has to be taken by all  the citizens and
will be provided by the state. Public investment in the provision of this
good may deprive resources for providing other things which are more
beneficial to the society. The second decision is in the definition of the
characteristics of  the good. The decision on these characteristics is taken
by either the government or its agents. These agents, if they are technical
organisations have higher autonomy, due to their higher information, in
defining the characteristics based on their own understanding of reality
or to suit their self-interest. The agent’s self-interest-based decision need
not be compatible with the social interest. Or there may be a wide gap
between the agent’s understanding and the true model of reality. It is
quite realistic to assume that governments need not always be well-
informed, and its decision can be influenced by ‘ideology’ and/or
‘incorrect models of reality’, and then what the government decides  as
the nature of merit good, need not be really required or accepted by the
people.
In dictatorial situations, this may lead to the forceful imposition
of the government decision, while in democratic regimes large sections
of people may refuse to accept such service provided by the government.
Such rejection can take place, if people and government have different
objectives. For example, a paternal decision by the government to reduce
the work load on students in its own schools, may lead to an increased
flow of students from government schools to others that entertain
competition and hard work.
Another probable reason for the rejection of a merit good by the
citizens is due to the cost of consumption. Even if a good is provided
free of charge, if its consumption requires some effort/time/resources on
the part of the consumers, they  may use it only if it is an optimal way of6
utilising there resources. This can manifests in water supply, as a
preference for nearby sources and the non-use of public sources situated
at distant places, even if water is provided freely by the public system.
One question that may arise here is that why should a
democratically elected government  offer a good, which is not acceptable
by the majority of its citizens. This may be due to the fact the elections
are not fought on specific policies, and the competition between political
parties is to harness voter support on a vaguely defined mixture of
policies. Thus even the democratically elected governments may take
and persist with a particular decision, that is not accepted by the majority.
Thus the decisions on the selection, and the definition of the
characteristics, can be a major source of inefficiency in the case of merit
good.
2.2 Inefficiency due to the choice of institutional framework
The second source of inefficiency lies in the selection of the
institutional mechanism to provide merit good. For example, the state
can produce and distribute the good free of charge, and such ‘direct
production’ is one institutional arrangement.  There can be other
institutional arrangements such as the provision of financial support to
the citizens so that they can buy the good from the market. The selected
institutional mechanism need not be the efficient one, either at the
beginning, or after some years of existence3. An institutional framework
can induce multiple levels of inefficiency on a short-term as well as long
term basis. First of all, the cheapest way of ensuring the consumption of
merit good need not be selected. For example, the direct production and
distribution by the government may not be the cost effective way, but
still this may be preferred (by the state). Even within this ‘state
production’ framework, production need not be done at the cheapest7
possible cost. The issue is that the production and distribution may take
place in an institutional framework, where cost-minimisation need not
be a real objective. Thus there can be multiple levels of inefficiencies,
due to the decision of the government to select a particular institutional
arrangement (out of a number of competing ones), to provide the merit
good. The factors that lead to the choice of a particular institution are
quite complex. By any means, we cannot assume a competitive pressure
on the government to choose the best possible institution. The past
experience of its own,  and others, ideology, incorrect models of reality,
influence of lobbying groups etc., too can shape the choice of the
institution. Thus the choice of an institutional arrangement which does
not aim at productive efficiency may happen quite often.
Even if the institution was efficient at one point of time, it need
not be the optimal one at a different point. Inspite of this inefficiency,
such an institution may persist. One important reason for this persistence
is the self-reinforcing feedback provided by the organisations developed
within the institutional framework (North, 1990). Whatever be the reasons
for the persistence of inefficient institution, it will widen the level of
productive inefficiency.
The two sources of inefficiency, described above, are interrelated.
For example, wrong definition of merit good characteristics can lead to
the selection of an inefficient institution. Or an inefficient institutional
framework can encourage an unrealistic characterisation of the merit
good. Thus there are possible linkages between the definition of the nature
of merit good and the institution chosen for delivering it.
Keeping this framework in mind, an attempt is made to analyse
the case of rural water supply of Kerala.8
3.   Case Study of Rural Water Supply in Kerala
Kerala is one state where the coverage of the public water systems
has been very low4. It was also found that even in the ‘notionally’ covered
areas, the utilization of public water systems is very low. The estimate
from population census indicate that only 19 per cent actually utilize the
public systems (Pushpangadan et al., 1996). This case study analyses
the reasons for the rejection or non-use of water supply provided by the
government, and thus analyses the sources of inefficiency in the provision
of this merit good, i.e, safe water. The analysis here is based on two
surveys conducted in different parts of mid-land Kerala.
3.1   First Survey: Facing Scarcity But Not Using Public System
A reconnaissance of the drinking water problem in Kerala villages
would encounter with the situation in which public water systems are
left under-utilized even in areas where people face scarcity. In order to
ascertain the causes of this problem, a census was done in the Nellaya
panchayath (of Ottappalam taluk of Palakkad district). This survey area
is inhabited by around 6500 people in about 1100 households. Each family
was asked to report the ‘distance they travel during summer to collect
drinking water, of required quantity and quality as per their own
standards’. This ‘scarcity indicator’ reflects criticality and indirectly takes
care of the quantity and quality requirements. This  indicator is averaged
for the families living in a grid area (of 500 m * 500 m size). The average
value of this indicator for each grid is shown in Figure 1.
It is evident from Figure 1 that there are families who travel more
than 400 meters to fetch drinking water during summer. Even for these
people, the street taps of the public systems are far off, as evident from
the same figure itself. These taps are more than 1 to 1.5 km away for
most the families5. For those households who currently travel 500 m
during summer, the distance to the street tap is more than 1.5 km.  This9
is mainly due to the fact that the public systems provide water through
the pipes laid along (and the street taps constructed in) the major roads
of the locality. Though the number of street taps are calculated on the
basis on some standard notion of coverage (such as one per 250 people),
these taps are provided in the main roads of the locality.
The statistical standard  of one tap per 250 people, is not translating
into a geographical reality of one tap within an area inhabited by 250
people. This is mainly due to the dominance of pipe-water systems in
the public provision. Pipe-water in a settlement structure of Kerala
Figure . 1.  Average Distance in meters to Drinking Water During
Summer10
(having no clusters of houses) is either costly if geographical standard
has to be met, or is unable to be closer to a large number of people if
only the statistical average is achieved.
Thus most of the people in the surveyed area depend on one or
other non-public source situtated within a distance of 500 m. These
sources are mainly perennial open wells, located in own or neighbours
plots. Though there are a number of open wells in each grid, a significant
part of them  are seasonal ones. During summer, an average of three
families use one perennial well. (The ratio of perennial wells to the
number of households in each grid is given in Figure 2).The percentage
Figure . 2.  Ratio of Perennial Wells to Household in Each Grid11
of perennial wells among total wells varies between 30 to 70 per cent (as
evident from Figure 3).  The families facing scarcity depend on one or
other perennial well in the nearby locality for the drinking water6.
The grid-wise distribution shows that the people living in areas
situated away from the main roads travel more for fetching water. It was
also found that  a large number of people who live nearer to main roads
are traditional settlers who have their own perennial wells. However the
new settlers, and especially people belonging to economically weaker
sections who normally settle away from roads, are the ones facing acute
scarcity and are not benefited by the existence of the public sources.
Figure. 3. Ratio of Perennial Wells To Total Number of Wells12
In summary, the street taps do not cater to the requirements of a
large number of people. These people depend on one or other private
source for meeting their need even during summer. This warrants a closer
analysis of the utilization of different systems of drinking water and the
demand for public systems. This was the motivation behind the second
survey.
3.2 Second Survey: The Sources that People Use
The second survey, conducted in three panchayaths of
Thiruvanathapuram district7, has the objective of assessing the following
parameters. (a) The sources of water that each family use during summer
and non-summer periods; (b) The mode of taking water to the house; (c)
The variations in source and mode of collection among various income
groups; and (d) The plans of the family to upgrade the system, which is
taken as an indirect reflection of their preference for a better system.
The details of surveyed area and sample size are given below.
Surveyed area:
Three adjacent panchayaths namely, Manickal, Pothenkode, and
Andoorkonam, which are situated in the mid-land part of
Thiruvananthapuram district.
Sample size:
Twenty five per cent of households, from two wards randomly
selected from each panchayath; Total sample size is 881 households.
In the surveyed area, 88.2 per cent of the households have their
own open well, while 11.2 per cent do not have one. There is a strong
relation between the land-holding status  and the ownership of an open
well as evident from Table 1.13
Table 1: Ownership of well and land holding status
Land-holding Status Percentage of land-holders within
the category having own open
wells
Less than 50 cents  85.5
Between 50 and 100  92.6
Between 100 and 150  93.0
Above 150 cents 100.0
 Thus most of the families have their own source of water, except
those who are at the lowest level of economic status. This also indicates
that most families make a major (capital) investment for acquiring
drinking water. This is evident from the fact that even among the very
small holders, a large number have their own water supply system. It
should be noted that the capital cost involved in digging an open well in
rural Kerala is higher than the capital cost required for getting a house
connection in the urban areas of the State8.
The dependence of people who do not have their own open well,
on different sources is showed in Table 2.
Table 2: The sources used by families who do not own a well
Source Percentage of families
Neighbour’s well 45.8
Public Well 41.7
Street tap  8.3
House Connection  1.214
Thus nearly 51 per cent of those who do not have an open well,
use a public source (including house connection, street taps and public
well). However among the public sources, public wells seem to be the
most used source. This shows that decentralised sources are being utilised
more than the taps provided by the centralised systems.
The utilisation pattern of different systems by the whole of surveyed
households during summer is given in Table 3. Open wells, both private
and public, cater to the drinking water requirements of nearly 96 per
cent of the people in the surveyed area. Nearly one-third of the households
who have own wells face scarcity during summer. These families, in
addition to those without wells depend on other private sources for
drinking water for about 3 to 4 months. Thus even during summer, 94.3
per cent households use private sources (own wells and neighbours’
wells). This strengthens the conclusion of the first survey that the use of
public taps is low even among those who face scarcity. The distance
travelled during summer is given in Tables 4.
Table 3 : The utilisation of different sources during summer
Source Percentage of Surveyed
families using





Table 4 : The distance travelled during summer
Range of distance Percentage of families
More than 500 m  1.5
300 - 400 m  0.8
200 - 300 m  3.5
100 - 200 m  9.8
50  - 100 m 11.9
Less than 50 m 72.5
Only around  1 - 2 per cent of the families have to travel more than
half a kilometer. However majority (more than 90 per cent) travel less
than 200 meters and nearly two-third of the families of the surveyed
locality travel less than 50 meters. This shows that these people can find
a source within 200 meters. Even though several open wells become dry
during summer, a significant number of perennial wells exist in the nearby
locality that are some what capable of meeting the requirements of  all
those living adjacently.  It is this local availability, that discourages the
people to use public sources situated more distantly. Secondly, people
take the effort to have some informal mechanisms to share water locally
and the transaction cost involved in this process seem to be lesser than
the ‘cost’ required to collect water from the free public source. This is
mainly due to the distance of the public source9.
On the plan of having an upgraded system (Table 5), those who do
not have open well preferred it, except a few who are living very close
to a public well or who do not have a piece of land suitable for digging
a well.16
Table 5: The explicit preference for a better source
Present status and Explicit preference Percentage of  those
percentage within and percentage of who demanded support
the total number of households within from state in terms
surveyed households the same status of loan or subsidy for
group realising their intention
among those expressed
intention
No Well:     11.8 to have a well:             37.9
No explicit intention    62.1   33.3
No Perennial to have a perennial well 51.5
Well :         26.7 No explicit intention    48.5   23.9
No Pump :   63.8 to have a pump:           18.7
No explicit intention:   81.3   33.3
Those who do not have perennial wells express plans to deepen
the existing ones or to have a new deep well. Regarding the mode of
collecting water, 37.2 per cent of households having perennial wells,
use (electric-driven) pumping systems. Another 18.7 per cent plans to
have pump in near future either using their own resources or with the
support of credit facilities. Though the rest of the households did not
express any preference for pumps, this may be an indication of their
lower levels of income. These observations indicate that, people prefer
to have a reliable supply of water near (or within) the house. In order to
have such a source, people spend (are ready to spend) a considerable
amount of resource, on their own. Only one-third of the households
expressed the need for any governmental support for acquiring their
preferred system of drinking water. Public systems which attempt to
ensure the supply of water within a particular distance (say one tap for17
250 people) is not meeting the requirement of large number of people
and thus these systems are left unused. This discrepancy is caused by
several factors and are accounted in the following sections.
4.   Institutional Mechanism Causing Inefficiency
The acquisition, treatment and free distribution by the state is the
prevailing institutional arrangement for public water supply in the rural
areas of Kerala.  These water projects are financed by the budgetory
allocations of the state and central governments and through the soft
loans taken by the Government (which will be repaid by the state through
budgetory allocations) and grants provided by the international
development agencies10. It is the broad concern that the whole population
should get safe drinking water, that has shaped the policy objective of
state government in this regard, and one can call this a merit good
argument. The merit good, considered here is safe drinking water, but in
reality it is taken as the pipe-water. Or pipe-water is taken as the only
form of safe drinking water11. Safe water is not defined as water with
some specific qualities, and attempts have not been made to see whether
this specified water can be acquired through any other cheaper mode.
Rather than doing this, pipe-water is taken to be same as safe water. This
assumption is found to be shaped by the following two factors. First of
all since pipe-water is the only form of safe water in cities, this is taken
as the ideal form by the socio-political system. Secondly, the organisation
(the earlier form of the Kerala Water Authority) which came to exist for
urban water supply12 and which gained expertise in technology suitable
for this purpose, has became responsible for rural supply too, and has
influenced the decision-making for rural water supply.  Thus the learning
pattern of this organisation which evolved in a specific institutional
framework, resulted in a particular technological choice13, disregard of
its social appropriateness. Thus connecting all households, both rural18
and urban, to the central pipe-water systems, became the ultimate aim of
the organization and this became the policy objective of the government,
which takes pride in extending the urban mode to rural areas. The essential
problem with the approach of the governmental organisation is that it
did not examine whether there are any other cost-effective sources of
safe water, taking certain quality standards as the criteria. Thus the well
water, which was catering to the drinking water requirements of Keralites
throughout history, and which continues to be the source for 92 per cent
of people even in those rural localities where public drinking water
systems have been implemented, is considered unsafe by the organisation,
without making any serious assessment of its quality14. Once pipe-water
is taken as the merit good, then the public agency is not bound to look at
the economy of providing water through a variety of other means. This
is the manifestation of the ‘autonomy’ that the public agency enjoys in
deciding the characteristics of merit good.
Within the institutional framework of free provision by the state,
the mechanism to transfer the information on the demand for water is
the political process. More specifically the local government has to
request, in a passed resolution, to the state-level organisation (namely,
Kerala Water Authority) to implement a rural water scheme in their
locality. Since the cost is borne by the state government and other
agencies, it does not influence the request of the local government15.
Thus some local governments wanted pipe-water schemes with
considerations of prestige and not of actual requirement.
In response to these requests, Kerala Water Authority has
implemented water supply schemes with provision for street taps and
could not provide house connections from centralised pipe systems due
to the exorbitant cost. A panchayath having 30000 population would be
provided with a scheme of 150 street taps. However we have seen that19
these taps are constructed mostly in the main roads of the panchayath,
are not at all attractive to the people who have some what reliable sources
(like open wells) closer to their home. Thus the public systems remain
non-beneficial to a large number of people.
Thus the characterisation of safe water as pipe water, and the
institutional framework of free provision in which potential beneficiaries
do not have to bear, either directly or indirectly, even a part of the cost
lead to a situation where this provided merit good,  is left unused by the
large sections of the people. This underutilisation is a major source of
inefficiency, in addition to allocative and technical inefficiencies in the
management of specific systems. Thus the created public systems fail to
solve the problem of drinking water to the expected level.
An attempt is made in the following sections to outline the selection
of an appropriate institutional framework for the provision of drinking
water.
5. Towards the Choice of an Appropriate Institutional Framework
The discussion on institutional choice sometimes narrowly focus
on either community or individual action as an alternative to state
intervention. Keeping these three as mutually exclusive categories, and
prescribing one or other of these three modes, will not be really helpful
in many complex situations. Some situations warrant all the three to go
together at different levels, depending on the characteristics of the
problem. Moreover, it is expected from the state to have a genuine concern
on the drinking water availability of its citizens, due to its positive
externalities. Thus government intervention is necessary, and the only
question is what form of intervention is the most appropriate.  Thus an
attempt is made to present a logical framework which can guide the
selection of the institutional choice of government intervention in drinking
water.20
The rationale for government intervention in drinking water should
be to ensure safe water for the whole population. However this has to be
achieved through two processes. The provision of safe water (in a locality)
must be made through the most economic method. Secondly, by ensuring
that the economically weaker sections get adequate amount of water
and their economic status does not reduce their access to safe water. The
concern for  economic sustainability demands that those who can afford
should be encouraged to bear the cost of water. The issues of cost-
effectiveness, equity and cost-sharing should be considered within the
specific characteristics of each locality.
Taking these as the concerns of the government, one should try to
understand the ‘best ways’ of providing water in a region and the
‘necessary role’ to be played by the Government. It is obvious that the
government role need not always be the centralised production (or
acquisition) and distribution of water. The public sector production and
provision is normally justified with either one or more of the following
reasons: the existence of natural monopolies, decreasing costs,
externalities, inability to charge and merit good (Roth, 1987). The features
of drinking water scene in rural Kerala like the existence of multiple
sources, and the possibility of using simple purification systems which
can easily be done even in small units without increasing cost, show that
there is no case of natural monopoly. Though the centralised pipe-water
systems in cities have the benefit of ‘decreasing costs’, such reduction
cannot be achieved in the scattered population settlement of rural Kerala.
This is due to the fact that the cost of pipe connections for individual
houses is significantly high and that there exists potential for a self source
closer to home. The government intervention need not be guided by the
reason of ‘inability to charge’ since there exists no technical problems
for charging the consumers of drinking water directly or indirectly.21
However the presence of externalities such as the reduction of
contagious diseases, and the potential for private overtapping of ground
water and other externalities associated with drinking water, and the
merit good argument that the consumers benefit to a greater extent than
they themselves believe, definitely calls for government intervention.
However the government should decide the characteristics of this merit
good in a realistic manner and follow the most economical step to ensure
that this good is received by all the population. Thus  safe water should
not be narrowly defined as the one served by centralised pipe-systems,
as is done today. Instead, water with certain measurable quality standards,
should be taken as the safe water. The next step is to identify the cheapest
way of ensuring this good in different localities.
This economic concern should guide the public agency to decide
the scale of production.  If large scale production (which require
intervention by either a public or collective agency) is the cheaper way
to produce, than the individual or decentralized production, then it has
to be resorted to. On the other hand, if individual production is cheaper,
then that should be encouraged16. The cost comparison should be made
for producing water of the same quality17. If individual production is
cheaper, then there is no economic reason to include such households
under the purview of a centralised production system.
However if certain households cannot afford to have an
independent self source, in spite of the physical possibility and its cost
effectiveness, then the equity concern should guide the government to
provide financial support (through grants or soft loans) to such families
to have their own independent system. This is the cost-effective way of
helping those who require government support for drinking water.
There are families who cannot have a self-source due to physical
reasons (lack of suitable locations within the homestead for perennial22
wells, etc.)18. If such is the case, then a single source catering to a group
of households may turn out to be the least-cost method. The ‘necessary
role’ of the government is to promote a number of small schemes
incorporating cost-sharing by those who can afford and subsidies for
those who cannot. However such intervention can be done better by the
local governments19 and the intervention of a central organisation like
Kerala Water Authority may not be necessary.
If there are localities where suitable sources are not available locally
and where large scale production using a central source is the cost-
effective method, then that should be resorted to20. This is the case of
urban areas and coastal belts in Kerala. The identification of large source
points (like river-based systems) and a centralized network of distribution
would be necessary in such cases. It is here that the intervention of a
centralised technical agency like Kerala Water Authority is required21.
 This form of identifying the role of government intervention and
that of the central technical organisation may require a detailed user
survey of all problem localities.  Moreover, in assessing people’s
preference for a particular system, care should be taken to make them
aware that they have to bear the cost of the system either through direct
payment or through the forgoing of other subsidised services. Similarly
the survey should also identify the potential source points and the likely
expenditure required for its development. Based on this information,
and on the procedure suggested above, the strategies and forms of
government intervention have to be decided. (This procedure is
schematically represented in  Figure 4.) Even for cases, requiring large
and centralised networks, optimial strategies linking potential source
points and delivery points should be evolved, rather than pursuing the
pre-conceived ones.23
6.  A Comment on the Impact of Ongoing Decentralisation in Kerala
Since there are some on-going efforts to involve local bodies in
the provision of drinking water, one can analyse the potential of such
efforts in correcting the mistakes made by the state government.
Decentralised planning may be helpful in reducing the information gaps
that a centralised organisation has on the requirements of each locality.
However the realisation of the potential of decentralised governance and
planning depends on a number of factors. First, the sectoral allocation of
funds by the national and state government according to certain pre-
conceived strategies may limit the location-specific utilization of funds,
even by the decentralized bodies. Secondly, the local bodies should not
be forced to accept the characterisation of merit good and technological
choice, done by the central technical organisation. Thirdly, if panchayaths
also consider the free provision of drinking water to all population as a
soft loan
Figure . 4. Identifying the role of the Government : A Suggested
Procedure24
virtue and tries to use funds available (nationally and internationally)
for this purpose22, it has certain negative ramifications. Unless people
are involved in sharing (at least a part of) the cost of this good, they do
not have an incentive to demand for cost reduction and to see that
resources are being utilized properly. In a situation where people have to
bear the cost (albeit partially) or have to forgo other subsidised public
services, people will not demand for a public drinking water scheme, if
it is not really necessary in a particular locality. This would help the
local bodies to utilize its resource (to provide subsidy) to localities which
are really in need. Instead, if drinking water schemes are implemented
only with grants (provided for that purpose), even the consultation of
people23 at the local level, may not lead to the implementation of useful
schemes.
7.   Summary
The characterisation safe water as pipe water, and institutional
framework of free distribution by the state agency, are the root causes of
the ineffectiveness of public water supply in rural Kerala. Thus the
provision of this merit good, as manifested in the construction of street
taps in main roads with full subsidy, does not cater to the drinking water
requirements of even those people who cannot afford to make their own
investments. Hence the provision of drinking water through public
systems is a failure in several parts of rural Kerala, on efficiency and
equity grounds.
The analysis shows that the institutional mechanism for
government intervention in drinking water supply, should be based on
the specific requirements of the localities. In certain cases, providing
financial assistance to dig open wells may be the best strategy. In certain
other cases, small systems catering to the requirements of a few families
will be appropriate. The gram panchayaths are the suitable organisation25
to promote such schemes and intervention of state government may not
be required. However, the funds for the subsidized provision of drinking
water should reach panchayath directly and not as a tied sectoral allocation
for drinking water through the central technical organisation.
Even for the schemes, implemented by the panchayaths, at least a
part of cost should be recovered from the beneficiaries directly24. Thus
the beneficiaries will have an incentive to demand (and suggest) cost-
effective schemes. If panchayaths are implementing schemes mainly with
grants, then there is no reason to believe that such schemes will not turn
out to be as ineffective as the existing public systems.
On the theoretical side, the paper shows the importance of analysing
the state’s characterisation of merit good and the selected institutional
mechanism to deliver it. In societies, where people are functionally
capable to exercise choices on consumption, the paternalistic
characterisation of any good may lead to gross inefficiency, if such
characterisation is widely different from the choice of the people. This
shows that even in the case of merit goods, its characterisation should be
the one that takes care of the preferences of the citizens. In terms of the
institution (to deliver such good), the paper shows that its selection should
be guided by its long-term capability to change in tune with realities as
well as the immediate effects on efficiency and effectiveness. The paper
shows the importance of analysing the merit good cases, in terms of the
gap between its characterised nature and people’s preferences, and of
the institutional choice. On the other hand, the question whether
government intervention is necessary or not, is almost irrelevant in such
cases.26
NOTES:
1. See Musgrave and Musgrave (1973). Since then there have been a number
of attempts to clarify and analyse the concept of merit good.
2. The traditional naive view of the government as one which acts for the
benefit of the society has been challenged by the public choice literature.
For a pioneering work in this direction, see Buchanan (1962)
3. The recent developments in New Institutional Economics, contributed
mainly by Douglas North, provides valuable insights into the efficiency
of institutions, and the persistence of inefficient institutions. See North
(1990, 1997)
4. There are different estimates of coverage. One estimate shows that 18.6
per cent of habitations are there without a single public source
(Pushpangadan et al. 1996). Full coverage (with regard to the quantity
of water) is achieved only in 0.8 per cent of the habitations.
5. In another study conducted in a mid-land village of Kollam, it was found
that 68 per cent of the families are more than 1 km away from the street
tap (Niyathi, 1996)
6. A part of the domestic requirements is also met by the ponds.
7. These Panchayaths have hydro-geological characteristics similar to those
of Nellaya.
8. The capital cost involved in an urban area is less than 1000 Rupees while
the cost of a well in mid-land Kerala will be around 5000-7000 Rupees.
9. The influence of travel cost is analysed by Pushpangadan et al., (1996)
10. The traditional source of finance was the state government, initially
through budgetory allocation alone and later through taking soft loans
(with an interest of 8.2%). From 1972-73, central government started
providing grant through its nationally conceived plan for ‘Accelerated
Rural Water Supply Schemes’. From the eighties onwards, international
agencies like World Bank, UNICEF, the development agencies of
countries like Netherlands, have started providing grants for rural drinking
water schemes. In the central government projects, there was a provision
that the local village government (or panchayath) should take up the
responsibility to mobilise 25% of the funds. However, this contribution27
was  not made necessary for the foreign-funded schemes. The details of
the funding  pattern can be seen in Government of Kerala (1990a)
11 It is true that people with higher levels of income prefer to have water in
the taps within the house. Sometimes this is interpreted as a wish for
getting house connection to a centralised pipewater system. In fact as
evident from the survey, what people prefer as their income increases, is
the reduction of distance to source. This is visible from the use of electrical
pumping systems by the majority of higher income groups. This
preference for the reduction of distance cannot be taken as the preference
for pipe-water cum centralised source. All these point to the untenability
of considering 'pipe water' as the merit good.
12. The organisation responsible in Kerala for the urban water supply was
the Public Works Department. These departments of Travancore and
Cochin States created and maintained water supply schemes for the urban
areas of Trivandrum and Cochin. This was later on put under the
responsibility of Water Works and Drainage Department in 1938. With
the merging of public health and water works departments, Public Health
Engineering Department came to exist  in 1956.
Initially the water supply schemes were limited to the urban areas. During
that period the state intervention in rural water supply was limited to the
digging of open and tube wells, by the public health department. Thus,
there were no major efforts to start pipe-water systems in the rural areas,
until the third Five-Year Plan (1964-69), as evident from the Table 5.
rural urban
Third plan 82.97 259.46 (in lakhs of Rupees)
Fourthoplan 450.47 2526.19
Fifth Plan 1112.67  2119.45
Sixth Plan 2923 4199
Source :  Government of Kerala (1990)
The investment in rural water supply got enhanced from Fifth plan
onwards with schemes sponsored by the Central Government (initially
as Minimum Needs Programme and later on with Accelerated Water
Supply Scheme). Thus by the end of 1980-81, 995 piped water schemes28
were existing in rural areas and another 483 schemes were under
construction. It is out of these schemes which tried to provide pipe-water
free to rural people, a major part are left unutilized by the people in a
large number of villages as evident from the surveys and other studies
on coverage.
13 The learning of organisations developed in an institutional framework
need not always enhance social benefits. See North (1990 : chapter 9)
14. In General, Kerala has achieved higher levels of helath indicators. In
this case there is not much difference between rural and urban Kerala.
Thus rural Kerala, which heavily depends on well water, as evident from
these surveys, cannot be taken to be suffered due to their dependence on
this traditional source.
15. Though a small portion has to be contributed by the local governments,
it  is  too low to influence the decision of the local body.
16. The scattered settlement with house in the middle of the homestead and
the high probability of  locating a suitable site for open well quite close
to the house may make individual production cheaper compared to the
large scale production in Kerala. This is mainly due to the high cost of
bringing water to the house from the source point of the central system.
This is noted by Hirshleifer et al. (1970:181). According to this study,
‘distribution costs may be very high for a low density of consumers
such as occurs in rural and suburb areas. Typical population for public
water systems are 330-500 people per mile of distribution main.The prices
that must be charged to cover the greater distribution costs in sparsely
settled areas are such as to make individual supply from wells an attractive
substitute’.
17. The traditional argument of Kerala Water Authority is that water from
open wells is not potable. However, water provided by the public  systems
is mostly from the same type of aquifer, and the physical and chemical
characteristics  of water from the two systems (i.e. private and public)
are comparable. Improper maintenance may lead to the biological
degradation of well water which can be made comparable to public water
through cheap chlorination techniques. (In fact, there are  evidences  that
the water quality of public systems in rural areas is  inferior to that of the
open wells and thus people use public water mainly for non-drinking29
purposes. See, Niyathi, 1996). Even if one does not question the basis of
this assumption of poor quality of water from open wells, the
circumstantial evidence point to the fact that even if the cost of changing
the quality of well water to the level of public water, is added to the total
cost of production, individual production may be cheaper than large scale
production in several localities.
18. The surveys, reported here, point to the fact that in several such cases, a
source can be located close to the locality. This is indicated by use of
neighborhood wells and the increased use of public wells and  the  low
use of street taps.
19. This is evident from the success of such small schemes in the Olavanna
village of Kozhikode district. Being a hilly terrain, people who bought
land at the hill tops, cannot have an independent open well at a reasonable
cost. This made families to form groups, and collect money to  make a
common well and pumping system, to distribute water to individual
families. The operation and maintenance of the system is also done
collectively, through collecting money from individual households. There
are such nineteen schemes, functional in 1997 in Olavanna village. (see,
Integrated Development Report, Olavanna Panchayath, p. 44).
20. One should also consider the future situation of the demand and supply
of water in deciding the appropriate system to be developed. However
there may not be a drastic increase in the number of households, given
the demographic transition that has already occurred (and is presently
occurring) in the rural areas of Kerala.
21. Limiting its function to such areas requiring its services would also
enhance this organisation's effectiveness.
22. Such an inherent assumption is there in the plans prepared by the local
bodies. For example see, the plan prepared by the District Panchayath of
Trivandrum in 1996.
23. There is a growing literature and number of case experiences which
argues for people's participation in the provision of merit goods, such as
drinking water. The effectiveness of participation depends on (a) the
reduction of gap between the government's characterisation of merit good
and the people's preference, (b) increase in the stakeness of direct
beneficiaries in the decison-making, through cost/kind/labour30
participation and (c) the incentives that encourage people to use their
indigenous knowledge and to demand cost-effective solutions. For a
discussion of participation in drinking water projects, see Deepa
Narayanan (1995).
24. The level of private investment for acquiring drinking water in Kerala,
indicates the readiness of the people to bear the cost. This shows that
cost-sharing is not impossible, if the implemented schemes could cater
to their real requirements. However Kerala Water Authority presently
could not achieve cost-sharing in rural schemes, because their schemes
do not cater to the requirements of the people.31
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